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The 1986-1987 Term of the United States Supreme
Court ended in June. This is the first of two articles
reviewing the major decisions involving criminal procedure decided this Term.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Curtilage
United States v. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (1987), presented
the Court with the opportunity to examine the "curtilage"
rule. An investigation led D.E.A. agents to believe that
Dunn was manufacturing phenylacetone and amphetamine on his ranch. Traversing several fences, agents
entered his property and peered into a barn where they
discovered a laboratory. Based on this information, the
agents obtained a warrant, arrested Dunn, and seized
chemicals and equipment. The barn was located approximately 50 yards from a fence that encircled the residence. Dunn challenged the initial warrantless entry onto
his property, and a federal appellate court held that the
barn was within the curtilage and thus subject to Fourth
Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court reversed. In earlier cases, the
Court had held that the Fourth Amendment did not
protect "open fields." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170 (1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
The Amendment's protection, however, did encompass
the residence and curtilage- the area immediately
surrounding the dwelling house. In Dunn the Court identified four factors which defined the curtilage:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the
home, whether the area is included within an
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the
uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by
the resident to protect the area from observation by
people passing by. 107 S.Ct. at 1139.
Applying these factors, the Court concluded that the
barn did not fall within the curtilage. It was located 50
yards from the house, was not within the residence
fence, was not used for the intimate activities of the
home, and the traversed fences were designed to corral
livestock, not to prevent observation.
.

The Court also ruled that while Dunn had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the barn, he had no such expectation in the open fields from which the agents peered into
the barn. To support its position, the Court quoted from
Oliver:
[T]he term "open fields" may include any unoccupied
or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage. An open
field need be neither "open" nor a "field" as those terms
are used in common speech. 466 U.S. at 180 n.11.
Since the agents did not enter the barn, but stood in an
open field to observe into the barn, there was no search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Searches of Government Employees
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987), involved a
search of a state hospital employee's office by hospital
officials who were investigating alleged improprieties.
The employee, Dr. Ortega, instituted a § 1983 suit
challenging the search. A plurality of the Court reached
several conclusions. First, public employees may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work.
Because of the great variety of work environments in the
public sector, however, this expectation of privacy must
be addressed on a case-by-case basis. In this case, Dr.
Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
desk and file cabinets because he did not share them
with other employees. Second, neither a warrant nor
probable cause is required in this context:
We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on
the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. !d. at 1502.
The case was then remanded to the District Court to determine whether the search in question satisfied the standard of reasonableness, both in its inception and scope.
The deciding vote was cast by Justice Scalia, who
wrote a concurring opinion. He objected to the plurality
opinion on several grounds. The case-by-case approach
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adopted by the plurality is "so devoid of content that it
produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field."
/d. at :1505. Instead of this approach, Justice Scalia would
hold that offices of government employees, including
drawers and files within those offices, are covered by the
Fourth Amendment as a general matter. In addition, however, he believed that searches to retrieve work-related
materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules
are reasonable and thus do not violate the Fourth
Amendment.

Particularity Requirement
In M'aryland v. Garrison, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (1987), the
police obtained a warrant to search Lawrence McWebb
and the "premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third
floor." When the police applied for the warrant and when
they executed it, they reasonably believed that only one
apartment was on the third floor. In fact, there were two
apartments- one occupied by McWebb and the other
by Garrison, the defendant. Before the police realized
that there were separate apartments, they discovered
heroin in Garrison's apartment. He challenged the
search as unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court rejected this challenge. According
to the Court, the case raised two issues-the validity of
the warrant and the reasonableness of its execution. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly prohibits the issuance of a
warrant except one "particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
This "requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the
Framersintended to prohibit." /d. at 1017. If the police
had known or should have known that there were separate apartm~nts, the warrantwould have been defective.
The constitutionality of their conduct, however, must be
judged in light of the information available at the time
they sought the warrant. Under this standard, their
conduct was constitutional.
The execution of the warrant presented a different issue. Here, again, the Court found the police's conduct
reasonable under the facts. Nevertheless, the Court
remarked:
If the officers had known, or should have known, that
the third floor contained two apartments before they
entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus
had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would
have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's
apartment. Moreover, as the officers recognized, they
were required to discontinue the search of respondent's apartment as soon as they discovered that there
were two separate units on the third floor. . . /d. at 1018.

Court had held that inventory searches of automobiles
were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. See also
Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (upholding an
inventory search of personal effects of an arrestee at the
police station). Opperman, however, did not involve the
opening of a closed container. Moreover, in other cases
the Court had held that searches of closed containers
generally required a warrant. See Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977). These cases led the Colorado Supreme Court to
rule that the drugs should have been suppressed.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, disagreed. According to tile Court, inventory searches differ from law enforcement searches, which are intended to enforce penal
laws. In contrast, inventory searches "serve to protect an
owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to
insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger." 107 S.Ct. at
741. These governmental interests outweigh the individual's interest in privacy and apply to closed containers. In
addition, "there was no showing that the police, who
were following standardized procedures, acted in bad
faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." /d. at 742.
The Court found it irrelevant that the van could have
been parked and locked at the scene or that Bertine was
not afforded an opportunity to make alternative arrangements for the safekeeping of his property.

Plain View Seizures
Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S.Ct. 1149 (1987), involved the
application of the plain view doctrine. A bullet fired
through the floor of Hicks' apartment struck a man in the
apartment below. The police entered Hicks' apartment
looking for the shooter and for weapons. They seized a
number of weapons. During the course of this search, an
officer noticed two sets of expensive stereo components,
which seemed out of place in the squalid apartment.
Suspecting that they were stolen, he moved some components to read the serial numbers. After learning that
they had been taken in a robbery, he seized them.
Although the validity of the initial entry was conceded
due to exigent circumstances created by the shooting,
Hicks challenged the seizure of the stereo components.
On review, the Supreme Court agreed with Hicks' position. According to the Court, moving the equipment
constituted a separate search: "But taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion,
which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of
respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstances that validated the entry." /d. at 1152. The Court
found the officer's conduct "much more than trivial." "A
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing
but the bottom of a turntable." /d. at 1153.
The Court next considered whether this search could
be justified under the plain view doctrine. "It is w&ll established that under certain circumstances the police
may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant."
Coolidge v. New Hamsphire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
The issue in Hicks was whether such a seizure could be
based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable
cause. The Court held that the higher probable cause
standard applied. It reached this conclusion by consider-

Automobile Inventory Seaiches
In Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987), the police
arrested the defendant for driving while intoxicated.
Before a tow truck arrived to take Bertine's van to an
impoundment lot, a backup officer inventoried its
contents in accordance with local police procedures. The
officer found drugs and cash in a closed backpack.
Bertine argued that the search of the backpack violated
the Fourth Amendment.
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the
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ing the underlying purpose of the plain view rule. That
rule permits a warrantless seizure. Thus, only the warrant
requirement is waived, not the quantum of proof needed
~, to justify the seizure:
df
t.
ld
rt
"
Dispensing with the nee or a warran IS wor s apa
from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the
seizure than a warrant would require, i.e., the standard
of probable cause. /d. at 1153-54. -

The Supreme Court upheld the search "because it
was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under well established principles." /d. 3167. The
Court found a "special need" for probation supervision,
which permitted "a degree of impingement upon privacy
that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at
large." /d. at 3168. This special need justified dispensing
with the warrant requirement, which the Court found to
be "impracticable" in this context:
A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system, setting up a
magistrate rather than the probation officer as the
judge of how close a supervis~on the p~obatio~~r
requires. Moreover, the delay mherent m obtammg a
warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct ...
and would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create ...
/d. at 3169.
Similarly, the Court believed that the application of the:
probable cause requirement would undermine probation
supervision. Instead, such searches are permissible if
the information indicates "only the likelihood ('had or
might have guns') of facts justifying the search." /d. at

Administrative Searches
New York v. Burger, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987), involved a
warrantless search of an automobile junkyard. Police
officers from the Auto Crimes Division entered Burger's
junkyard to conduct an inspection pursuant to a New
York statute. After checking Vehicle Identification Numbers, they determined that several stolen cars were in the
yard. Burger was charged with possession of stolen
property and challenged the inspection on Fourth
Amendment grounds. The New York Court of Appeals
agreed with Burger, because the searches were undertaken for law enforcement, not regulatory, purposes.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court long had
recognized the applicability of the Fou~h Ame~dment to
administrative inspections of commercial prem1ses for
the purposes of enforcing regulatory statutes. See v. City
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The Court, however, also
had recognized a special rule for pervasively regulated
industries. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a "closely regulated" industry has a reduced
expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause
requirements ... have lessened application in _this c?ntext. Rather, we conclude that ... where the pnvacy Interests of the owner are weakened and the government
interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless inspection of
commercial premises may well be reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 107 S.Ct. at

3171.

Good Faith Exception
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was
first announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984). In Leon the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule
did not apply to evidence obtained by police officers who
acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon a search
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, even when the
warrant was later found to be unsupported by probable
cause. Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987), involved the
extension of Leon to a search pursuant to a statute
authorizing warrantless administrative searches, which
was later declared unconstitutional.
The defendants operated an automobile wrecking
yard, which was subject to periodic inspections pursuant
to a state statute. During one inspection, the police
seized several cars which had been stolen, and the
defendants were charged with violating several motor
vehicle statutes. The day after the search, a federal court
in an unrelated case ruled the statute unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court found the good faith exception
applicable:
The approach used in Leon is equally applicable to the
present case. The application of the exclusionary rule
to suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in
objectively reasonable reliance on a statute would
have as little deterrent effect on the officer's actions as
would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in
objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant. Unless a
statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be
expected to question the judgment of the legislature
that passed the law. If the statute is subsequently
declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence
obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial declaration will not deter future Fourth Amendment violations
by an officer who has simply fulfilled his responsibility
to enforce the statute as written./d. at 1167.

2643.

Statutory schemes fall within this exception if they advise
owners that the search is being conducted pursuant to
the law, the search is limited in scope, and the discretion
of those conducting the search is circumscribed. The
Court concluded that the statute satisfied this criteria.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that the statutory scheme was designed to enforce
penal laws. Rather, the Court found the statute to be
intended principally to further administrative purposes.
"Nor do we think that this administrative scheme is
unconstitutional simply because, in the course of enforcing it, an inspecting officer may discover evidence of
crimes, besides violations of the scheme itself:' /d. at
2651. Finally, the Court found no constitutional signi- .
ficance in the fact that the statute was enforced by pollee
officers rather than "administrative" agents.

Probation Searches
Joseph Griffin, who was on probation, had his home
searched by probation officers. They had no warrant. A
gun was found, and Griffin was convicted of a weapons
violation. These facts became the subject of the Court's
decision in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987).
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Applying this reasoning to the facts, the Court concluded
that the police reliance on the statute was objectively
reasonable.

this.s.tandard to be inconsistent with Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477 (1972), which required the prosecution to establish the voluntariness of a confession by only a preponderance of evidence.
We now reaffirm our holding in Lego: Whenever the
~State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress
a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in
violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need prove
waiver by only a preponderance of evidence. 107 S.Ct.
at523.
Analyzing Connelly's waiver, the Court found his
perception of coercion stemming from the "voice of
God''-n·relevant:tike'the Due Process issue, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination requires
governmental involvement: "The sole concern of the
Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is
governmental coercion." /d. at 523.

CONFESSIONS

Voluntariness - Governmental Involvement
The defendant in Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S.Ct. 515
(1986), approached a policeman and stated that he had
murdered someone and wanted to talk about it. The officer advised Connelly of his Miranda rights. After the
arrival of a homicide detective, Connelly again received
Miranda warnings, after which he stated that he had
killed Mary Ann Junta during November 1982. He subsequently led the police to the location of the crime. The
next morning Connally became visibly disoriented during
an interview with a public defender. He stated that
"voices" had told him to confess. He was sent to a state
hospital for a mental evaluation. Although he was initially
found incompetent to stand trial, later evaluations concluded that he was competent.
At trial Connelly filed a motion to suppress. A state
psychiatrist testified that he was suffering from chronic
schizophrenia at least as of the day before his confession. He told the psychiatrist that he was following the
"voice of God." According to the psychiatrist, Connelly
was experiencing "command hallucinations," which interfered with his volitional abilities- his ability to make
free and rational choices. His cognitive abilities, however,
were not significantly impaired; that is, he understood his
right to remain silent. The trial court suppressed the
statements, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.
The court found that the confession was not the product
of Connelly's free will, and thus was involuntary under
the Due Process Clause, even though the police had
done nothing wrong or coercive in securing the confession. The court also found that his mental condition precluded him from waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court first
addressed the Due Process issue. Under this analysis,
"certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as
applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that
they must be condemned." Miller v. Fenton, 106 S.Ct.
445, 449 (1985). Nevertheless, the Court's consideration
of involuntary confessions under the Due Process
Clause has "focused upon the crucial element of police
overreaching." 107 S.Ct. at 520. For example, in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), the defendant was
"probably insane at the time of his confession." Yet, the
crucial aspect of the case was that the police knew this
and "exploited this weakness with coercive tactics." 107
S.Ct. at 521. The Court wrote: "The most outrageous
behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence
against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause." /d. Accordingly,
"coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the
finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause .. ."/d. at 522.
The Court next addressed the Miranda issues. The
Colorado Supreme Court had held that the prosecution
must establish a waiver of Miranda rights by "clear and
convincing evidence." The U.S. Supreme Court found

Miranda - Interrogation
Arizona v. Mauro, 107 S.Ct. 1931 (1987), involved the
meaning of "interrogation" under Miranda. Responding
to a telephone call from a store, the police arrived at the
scene, at which time Mauro said that he had killed his
son. He directed the police to the body, was arrested,
and advised of his Miranda rights. He was again read his
rights at the police station, but at this point he requested
an attorney. Mauro's wife then requested to speak with
him. The police granted the request on the condition that
an officer be present. The officer placed a tape recording
machine in plain sight. Mauro told his wife not to answer
questions until a lawyer was present. At trial Mauro raised ,
an insanity defense. In rebuttal the prosecution played
~
the taped interview between Mauro and his wife, arguing
that it demonstrated his sanity on the day of the killing.
fv1al1r:o_ sought to suppress the tape recording on the
grouliostHafffconsfiti.ited interrogation under Miranda.
On review, the Supreme Court rejected Mauro's argument. Miranda is triggered only by custodial interrogation. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the
Court had ruled that the Miranda safeguards extended
not only to express questioning but also to its "functional
equivalent," which the Court defined as "any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." /d. at 301. During the conversation with his wife, the police asked no questions. Moreover, their conduct did not amount to the type of psychological ploy that would be the functional equivalent of
questioning. The police did not send her to speak with
her husband. Indeed, they attempted to discourage her,
and only relented when she insisted.
Miranda- Warnings
Colorado v. Spring, 107 S.Ct. 851 (1987), presented the
question whether a suspect's awareness of all the crimes
about which he may be questioned is relevant to determining the validity of his decision to waive the Fifth
Amendment. An informant told agents of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) that Spring was
involved with the interstate transportation of firearms. He
also mentioned that Spring participated in the killing of
John Walker. At the time, Walker's body had not been
4
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found, and the police had received no report of his disappearance. The ATF agents arrested Spring after an
undercover purchase of firearms. They read him Miranda
warnings on two occasions, and he signed a written
waiver. After questioning him about firearms transactions, the agents asked whether Spring had ever shot
anyone. He mumbled, "I shot another guy once." Several
months later state police officers questioned him about
the homicide. He waived his rights and confessed.
Spring argued that his first statement was invalid because he was not informed that he would be questioned
about the murder. The Supreme Court rejected this argument: "Spring's argument strains the meaning of compulsion beyond the breaking point." /d. at857. The
validity of a waiver has two aspects. First, the relinquishment of the right must be voluntary, i.e., not the result of
intimidation, coercion, or deception. The trial court found
no evidence of coercion. Second, the waiver must be
made with a full awareness of both .the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of that decision. Here, the Court found that Spring understood that
he could remain silent and that anything he said could be
used against him. This was all that was required: "The
Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect
know and understand every possible consequence of a
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege." /d.
The Court also rejected an alternative argument
offered by Spring- that failure to inform him about the
homicide constituted police trickery. The Court wrote:
"Once Miranda warnings are given, it is difficult to see
how official silence could cause a suspect to misunderstand the nature of his constitutional right- 'his right to
refuse to answer any question which might incriminate
him."' /d. at 858-59 (quoting United States v. Washington,
431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977)).

chose to speak. /d. at 832.
Nor did the Court believe that his limited request for
counsel evidenced a failure to understand the consequences of his waiver, because Barrett had testified that
he understood his Miranda rights.

Impeachment by Silence
Greer v. Miller, 107 S.Ct. 3102 (1987), involved the
impeachment of a defendant with his postarrest silence.
Miller was charged with kidnapping, robbery, and
murder. At trial he testified in his own defense, denying
any direct involvement in the crimes. The prosecutor
began his cross-examination as follows:
Q: Mr. Miller, how old are you?
A:23.
Q: Why didn't you tell this story to anybody when you
got arrested?
The defense counsel objected and asked for a mistrial.
The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the
jury to ignore the question "for the time being." The prosecutor did not pursue this line of questioning, nor did he
mention it in closing argument. Miller was convicted. In a
subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court
of appeals ruled that the prosecutor's conduct required
reversal.
The Supreme Court disagreed. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held that "the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." /d.
at 619. Unlike Doyle, however, the prosecution was not
permitted to use Miller's postarrest silence for impeachment:
[T}he trial court in this case did not permit the inquiry
that Doyle forbids. Instead, the court explicitly sustained an objection to the only question that touched
upon Miller's postarrest silence. No further questioning
or argument with respect to Miller's silence occurred,
and the court specifically advised the jury that it should
disregard any questions to which an objection was
sustained. 107 S.Ct. at 3108.
Thus, there was no Doyle violation because there was no
improper use of postarrest silence. In addition, the Court
found no due process violation due to the prosecutor's
attempt to violate Doyle. "The sequence of events in this
case- a single question, an immediate objection, and
two curative instructions- clearly indicates that the
prosecutor's improper question did not violate Miller's
due process rights." /d. at 3109.

Miranda- Waiver
After his arrest for sexual assault, William Barrett was
read the Miranda warnings. He signed and dated an
acknowledgment that he had been warned of his
constitutional rights. He then stated that "he would not
give the police any written statements but he had no
problem in talking about the incident." Connecticut v.
Barrett, 107 S.Ct. 828, 830 (1987). Thirty minutes later he
again stated that he would not give a written statement
without his attorney but had "no problem" talking about
the incident. He then orally admitted his involvement in
the crime. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that
Barrett had invoked his right to counsel by refusing to
make written statements without the presence of his
attorney.

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. According to the Court, the police could not have obtained a
written statement from Barratt once he had invoked his
right to counsel. His assertion of the right to counsel,
however, involved only written statements:
Barrett's limited requests for counsel ... were accompanied by affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak with the authorities. The fact that
officials took the opportunity provided by Barrett to
obtain an oral confession is quite consistent with the
Fifth Amendment. Miranda gives the defendant a right
to choose between speech and silence, and Barrett

Exclusion from Competency Hearing
In Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S.Ct. 2658 (1987), the defendant, who was charged with sexual child abuse, was
excluded from a hearing held to determine the
competency of two child witnesses. Stincer argued his
exclusion violated the right of confrontation and due
process. At the hearing, the children, ages 7 and 8, were
questioned by the prosecutor and defense counsel, and
were found to be competent by the trial court.
On review, the Supreme Court rejected the confronta-
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tio_n argument. Two factors influenced the Court:~. de!Cision. First, the competency hearing had a limited function. It was intended to determine whether the child is
capable of observing and recollecting facts, whether the
child is capable of narrating those facts to the jury, and
whether the child has a moral sense of the obligation to
tell the truth. Accordingly, the children were asked background questions such as their names, where they went
to school, and how old they were. They were also asked
whether they knew what a lie is and whether they knew
what happens when one tells a lie. Thus, the issues
raised at the hearing were unrelated to the basic issues
of the trial.
Second, the primary function of the Confrontation
Clause is the right of cross-examination. Stincer was
provided with the opportunity to cros!?-examine both children at trial. Some of the same questions that were
asked at the hearing were again asked at trial. Moreover,
the defense had the opportunity to ask whatever questions it wished on the competency issue because that
issue remained open throughout the trial. In light of
these two factors, the Court found against Stincer.
Stincer's due process argument fared no better. The
Court acknowledged that "a defendant is guaranteed the
right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would
contribute to the fairness of the procedure." /d. at 2667.
Given the particular nature of the competency hearing,
however, the Court could find no reason "that his presence ... would have been useful in ensuring a more
reliable determination as to whether the witnesses were
competent to testify." /d. at 2668.

The Supreme Court ruled that Bruton did not cover
Marsh's case. In Bruton the codefendant's confession
expressly implicated Bruton as the accomplice. In
contrast, Williams' confession on its face did not implicate Marsh. Marsh was linked to the confession only
through other evidence admitted at trial, i.e., her own
testimony. The Court held that "evidentiary linkage" or
"contextual implication" did not present the potential for
jury disregard of the limiting instruction that underlie the
Bruton decision:
In short, while it may not always be simple for the
members of a jury to obey the instruction that they
disregard ancincriminating inference, there does not
exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to
do so that is the foundation of Bruton's exception to the
general rule. 107 S.Ct. at 1708.
In addition, the Court cited the practical difficulties of
adopting a different rule. A redacted confession can be
reviewed prior to trial, but assessing "evidentiary linkage" prior to trial is often impossible. Moreover, the use
of separate trials or complete exclusion of the confession
were alternatives that the Court fouhd unacceptable.
Bruton - Interlocking Confessions
Cruz v. New York, 107 S.Ct. 1714 (1987), also involved a
Bruton issue. In an earlier case, Parker v. Randolph, 442
U.S. 62 (1979), the Court was unable to resolve authoritatively whether Bruton applied to interlocking confessions
-situations where the defendant's own confession
corroborates the codefendant's confession.
Eulogio Cruz was tried along with his brother, Benjamin, for the death of a gas station attendant. Benjamin's
confession, which implicated Eulogio, was admitted at
trial. Since Eulogio had also confessed, the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed.his conviction. It based its
decision on Parker, in which a plurality of the Court had
held Bruton inapplicable to interlocking confessions. The
plurality reasoned that Bruton applied only when the nontestifying codefendant's confession was "devastating" to
the defendant's case, which was not the situation when
the defendant has himself confessed to essentially the
same facts. Four Justices disagreed with this reasoning,
but one found against Parker on harmless error grounds.
Thus, Parker lost his appeal, even though the Court was
evenly divided on the issue of interlocking confessions.
With this background, the Court returned to the issue
of interlocking confessions in Cruz. This time a majority
of the Court rejected the reasoning of the Parker plurality
and found a Bruton violation:
This case is indistinguishable from Bruton with respect
to those factors the Court has deemed relevant in this
area: the likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded, ... the probability that such disregard will
have a devastating effect, ... and the determinability
of these facts in advance of trial ... 107 S.Ct. at 17·; 9.

Bruton - Redacted Confessions
Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987), was one of
two cases dealing with Bruton issues. In Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court found a confrontation violation where a nontestifying codefendant's confession, which implicated Bruton, was admitted at a joint
trial. The Court believed that an instruction limiting
admissibility to the confessing defendant would be
ineffective, and thus the jury would use the confession
against Bruton, who had no opportunity to confront his
codefendant. One way to avoid a Bruton situation is to
redact or eliminate any reference about the codefendant.
The prosecutor followed this procedure in Marsh.
Marsh was present during a robbery and murder incident. A witness testified about her conduct during the
crime, indicating that Marsh, along with two others, was
an active participant. The confession of her codefendant,
Williams, was then admitted in evidence. This confession
was redacted to omit all reference to Marsh. Indeed, it
omitted all reference to anyone other than Williams and
Martin, the third alleged accomplice, who was a fugitive
at the time of the trial. Marsh testified in her own defense.
She admitted being present at the scene but denied any
prior knowledge that the crime would occur. Her testimony, however, placed her in a car with Williams and Martin
just prior to the crime, and Williams' confession indicated
that the crime was discussed at that time. The court
instructed the jury that Williams' confession could be
considered only when determining Williams' guilt. The
jury convicted both. Marsh appealed, citing Bruton.

Hearsay
Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2775 (1987), raise~
evidentiary and constitutional issues about the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)
(2)(E). The evidentiary questions concerned the procedural aspects governing admissibility. First, the Court
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ruled that the trial court in determining the admissibility
of coconspirator statements must use the "preponderance of evidence" standard of proof. Second, the Court
held that preliminary proof of the conspiracy as well as
the defendant's and declarant's participation in the
conspiracy need not be established by independent
evidence. In other words, the hearsay statement itself
may be considered in determining admissibility. Compare Ohio R. Evid. 801(D)(2)(e) (requiring "independent
proof").
·
More importantly, the Court ruled that statements falling within the coconspirator exception automatically
satisfy confrontation requirements. The Court stated that
two factors were important in deciding confrontation
questions in this context: "[T]he Court has, as a general
matter only, required the prosecution to demonstrate
both the unavailability of the declarant and the 'indicia of
reliability' surrounding the out-of-court declaration." /d.
at 2782. In United States v. lnadi, 106 S.Ct. 1121 (1986),
the Court addressed the first factor, holding that unavailability need not be established when the prosecution
offers coconspirator statements. As for the second (reliability) factor, the Court quoted from Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980), which stated that reliability could be
presumed in the case of a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." Tracing the judicial history of the coconspirator
exception back over a century and a half, the Court found
the exception "firmly rooted."

Graham, 450 U.S. 24,29 {1981). In addition, there is no ex
post facto violation if the change does not alter "substantial personal rights," and mere changes of "modes of
procedure" do not affect matters of substance. Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 {1977).
Applying these principles, the Court in Miller found the
use of the revised sentencing guidelines constitutionally
defective. The guidelines were imposed retrospectively,
they disadvantaged the defendant by subjecting him to
the possibility of increased punishment, and they could
not be characterized as "procedural."
EXTRADITION
Richard Smolin was charged with parental kidnapping
in Louisiana. Louisiana then asked for his extradition
from California. A California court, however, issued a writ
of habeas corpus precluding extradition. The court found
that since Smolin had custody under California custody
decrees, he was not "substantially charged" with a crime in
Louisiana. The California Supreme Court upheld the writ.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in California v.
Superior Court, 107 S.Ct. 2433 (1987). The Extradition
Clause is found in Article IV of the Constitution:
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found
in another State, shall on Demand of the executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of
the Crime.
·
This Clause is implemented through the Extradition Act
of 1793. Under the Act, extradition is a summary procedure. Determining guilt or innocence, or considering the
availability of defenses, is not appropriate. Such issues
are to be litigated in the courts of the demanding State.
Only four issues are properly considered in an extradition proceeding:
(a) whether the extradition documents on their face are
in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged
with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the
petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978).
Since these requirements were satisfied, California had
to extradite. The breadth of the Court's decision is
captured in the concluding paragraph:
We are not informed by the record why it is that the
States of California and Louisiana are so eager to force
the Smolins halfway across the continent to face criminal charges that, at least to a majority of the California
Supreme Court, appear meritless. If the Smolins are
correct, they are not only innocent of the charges
against them, but also victims of a possible abuse of
the criminal process. But, under the Extradition Act, it
is for the Louisiana courts to do justice in this case, not
the California courts: "surrender is not to be interfered
with by the summary process of habeas corpus upon
speculations as to what ought to be the result of a trial
in the place where the Constitution provides for its
taking place." 107 S.Ct. at 2441.
In a second extradition case, Puerto Rico v. Branstad,
107 S.Ct. 2802 (1987), the Court overruled Kentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), and held that a federal

EX POST FACTO LAWS
Miller v. Florida, 107 S.Ct. 2446 (1987), presented the
Court with an ex post facto issue. Miller was convicted of
sexual battery. At the time the crime was committed,
Florida's sentencing guidelines would have resulted in a
presumptive sentence of three and one-half to four and
one-half years imprisonment. Revised guidelines in
effect at the time of sentencing called for a presumptive
sentence of five and one-half to seven years imprisonment. The trial court used the revised guidelines and
imposed a seven-year sentence. The Florida Supreme
Court upheld the sentence because the revised guidelines represented a procedural change, which did not
require the application ofthe ex post facto doctrine.
The Supreme Court reversed. Article I of the U.S.
Constitution provides that neither Congress nor any
State shall pass any "ex post facto Law." In Calder v. Bull,
3 Dall. 386 (1798), the Court set forth the contours of this
prohibition:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when
done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives
less, or different testimony, than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense, in order to
convict the offender. /d. at-390 (emphasis omitted).
~ubsequent cases set out further principles. The law
must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events
occurring before its enactment," and the law "must
disadvantage the offender affected by it." Weaver v.
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court can issue a writ of mandamus to cempel the §evernor of a state to perform the mandatory, ministerial duty
of delivering a fugitive upon proper demand by another
state.

the Court's prior cases, retroactivity in this context was
determined by a three-pronged analysis: "(a) the
purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
The Court in Griffin held that "failure to apply a newly
declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on
direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adju- ·
dication." 107 S.Ct. at 713. First, the integrity of judicial
review requires the application of a new rule to all similar
case-s~penoing~dh"'Clirect review; announcing new, prospective~only rules smacks more of a legislative, rather
than an adjudicative, function. Second, "selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same." /d. Given these
principles, the Court refused to continue to recognize a
"clear break?' exception to retroactivity for cases pending
on direct review:
We therefore hold that a new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to
all cases, state or federal, ... with no exception for
cases in which the new rule constitutes a "clear break"
with the past. /d. at 716.

RETROACTIVITY
In Griffin v. Kentucky, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987), the Court
announced a new retroactivity rule. Griffin involved the
retroactive application of Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct.
1712 (1986), which the Court decided in the prior Term.
Batson challenged the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from a jury. The Court ruled
that a defendant could establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges to strike members of the defendant's race.
Once the defendant had made the prima facie showing,
the burden shifted to the prosecution to come forward
with a neutral explanation for those decisions. In Allen v.
Hardy, 106 S.Ct. 2878 (1986), the Court had held that
Baston was not to be applied retroactively to a case on
federal habeas review. In that case the Court determined
that Baston "is an explicit and substantial break with
prior precedent" because it overruled a portion of Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
Griffin presented the retroactivity issue as applied to
litigation pending on direct state or federal review. Under
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